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ABSTRACT
An abstract of the thesis of Hal T. Nelson for the Master of Science in Political
Science presented November 8, 2002.
Title: Presidential Domain: An Exploratory Stndy of Prospect Theory and US
Climate Policy Since 1998.
The Bush administration's decision to abandon the Kyoto Protocol can be
explained by prospect theory. The change in federal climate policy between the
Clinton and Bush administrations was due to the difference in domain that each
president operated under. President Clinton operated under a domain oflosses as he
associated continued fossil fuel use with future socio-economic and environmental
damages from climate change. This domain oflosses increased President Clinton's
risk tolerances and explains his pursuit of the Kyoto Protocol, an international
agreement to limit greenhouse gas emissions. Conversely, President Bush operated
under a domain of gains where he did not connect fossil fuel use with futnre damages,
rather with continued economic growth. President Bush's domain of gains reduced his
risk tolerance and resulted in his pursuit offossil fuel intensive economic development
policies.
This paper defines the domain that Presidents Clinton and Bush operated under
regarding climate change, the independent variable ofthis analysis. A total of 26
speeches on climate change by these presidents were coded to explicate domain
according to two categories of beliefs. The single most salient variable is the decision
makers beliefs about the perceived robustness of the current state of scientific
knowledge on climate change. The second most important aspect of these decision
makers beliefs revolve around the role of fossil fuels in economic growth.
Once domain has been defined through the cognitive maps and each decision
makers corresponding risk tolerance explicated, the dependent variable of policy
preferences are analyzed. Two policy options are analyzed; the business as usual
(BAU) option associated with the status quo, as well as a climate protection policy that
is reflective of the emissions reductions associated with US compliance with Kyoto.
These two policy options are evaluated in three case studies; the economy wide costs
of compliance with Kyoto targets for greenhouse gas emissions, the public health
impacts of greenhouse gas reductions, and finally against a component of the Kyoto
Protocol that allows for international trading of permits to emit greenhouse gases.
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"He is no wise man that will quit a certainty for an uncertainty." Samuel Johnson
With these few, simple words Samuel Johnson graceful1y stated much of the
foundation for public policy decision-making. Human beings are by nature a risk
averse lot, preferring the security that comes with the familiarity of the status quo.
Empirical studies have demonstrated humans' penchant for the status quo over
alternatives with higher expected outcomes (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991,
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Policy makers are not significantly different from
other humans in this regard. For public policy to deviate more than incremental1y
from the current way of doing things requires a synthesis of variables that perceive the
status quo as undesirable.
The human tendency to favor the status quo becomes especial1y important when
combined with the fragmented structure ofthe US political system. The US system of
judicial review, the separation of powers, a bicameral legislature, and federalism
empower groups and individuals who have vested interests in the status quo to
effectively block changes in policy that might adversely affect them. In explaining the
basis for what they cal1 the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, True, Jones &
Baumgartner (1999) state,
As opposed to smooth, moderate adjustments to changing circumstances, the
conservative nature of the national political system often favors the status quo,
thereby making conflict or an extraordinary effort necessary for a major change
(p.98).
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While recognizing the primacy of the status quo, this paper takes a different approach
to explain the US climate policy process. Instead of operating at a systemic or even
institutional level, this analysis proceeds at the individual level of analysis. An
individual level of analysis is appropriate for this case study because the units of study
are Presidents' Clinton and George W. Bush and their statements and actions on the
issue of climate policy. Because of the agenda setting, legislative, and foreign policy
decision-making powers of the office, presidential case studies can provide an
empirical laboratory for testing individual decision-making theories (McDermott,
1998, Levy, 1997). Rather than theory testing, this analysis utilizes the individual
decision-making theory known as prospect theory to explain the difference in policies
between the two presidents. Prospect theory can yield important information about
presidential decision-making. As McDermott (1998) states
[I]t is worthwhile to investigate the extent to which a decision maker's cognitive
biases might affect his choices, and subsequently even his state's behavior, in
systematic and predictable ways (35).
The cornerstone of prospect theory is its treatment of the status quo, or domain, as a
reference point for decision-making. Domain is an independent variable that affects a
person's ability to tolerate risk in their behavior. If a person believes that the status
quo is acceptable then he or she is acting under the domain of gains, and will be risk
averse in their behavior. Conversely, if the status quo is unacceptable to a decision
maker, then he or she is acting under the domain of losses. Under this domain,
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individuals are then able to tolerate more risk in supporting policies to alleviate the
unacceptable condition.
In addition to considerable empirical support', this theory has significant intuitive
appeal and can be applied to many policy decisions. One particularly salient example
is the Civil War. President Lincoln's anti-slavery platform was the centerpiece of the
new Republican Party. The Republican victory in the 1860 presidential election drove
the Southern states to secession. Lincoln believed that the status quo of secession of
the Southern states was unacceptable on Constitutional grounds (Oates, 1977, p.234).
This placed him in the domain of losses and increased his risk tolerance. The policy
outcome of this condition was his support for military action to prevent secession of
the South. In doing so he risked his own life and the lives of thousands of others.
IDaniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky exerted a large part oftheir considerable energies to empirical
study of cognitive decision theories. Theirs and others' empirical studies of cognitive decision theory
are included in the following literature review.
3
1. Introduction
While history is rife with possible applications of prospect theory, this
examination concentrates on the slightly more timely issue of federal climate policy.
The Bush administration's rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, an international agreement
negotiated extensively by the Clinton administration to limit the emission of
greenhouse gases, provides us with a rich and timely issue area to study. Climate
change has been described as the public policy problem from hel1.2 This is due to the
pervasiveness offossil fuels throughout the modern economy, the long-term
intergenerational nature of the problem, and the redistributive nature of policies to
mitigate emissions. Therefore, the benefits of mitigation are long term and dispersed,
while the costs are immediate and concentrated.
In addition to the political problems of enacting sagacious climate policies, the
complexities of the climate system itself mean that scientists are bound to be divided
on how to define the implications of human actions. Therefore, any mitigation
policies will be subject to uncertainties about the cost and benefits of the policies.
Secondly, climate protection policies are unique in many ways. As such, this paper
outlines how prospect theory can explain so much about these environmental and
socio-economic policy decisions that are made under conditions of uncertainty with
extended temporal elements. Given the short term nature of the political and business
cycles, it is important to understand why a society should undertake a greenhouse gas
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reduction program under conditions of extreme uncertainty in its costlbenefit analysis
and in a situation where many of the benefits from the program are decades away.
Hopefully, prospect theory can shed some light on this issue.
After exploring the background of climate change policy, this analysis
proceeds by defining the domain that Presidents Clinton and Bush operated under
regarding climate change, the independent variable of this analysis. A total of 26
speeches and comments on climate change by these presidents were analyzed to
explicate domain, 13 for each president. To operationalize domain, cognitive maps
were constructed according to the coding rules explicated by Wrightson (1976). The
procedure is to first identify important variables, then to identify which variable is the
cause and which is the effect variable, then finally to determine whether the
relationship between the variables is positive (+), negative (-), no relationship (0), or
indeterminate (?). Thus, the cognitive map is a collection of: Cause Concept ~
Linkage ~ Effect Concept for the policy variable under consideration. Because of the
timeliness of the issue, the quantity and quality of the information available to the
researcher was limited. Past successes in applying prospect theory to foreign policy
decision has had the benefit of presidential archives (McDermott 1998, Levy, 1997).
In spite of this limitation, the limited amount of information available still yielded rich
maps of the domain for each president.
For this analysis, domain is defined according to two categories of beliefs. The
single most important variable are the decision makers beliefs about the perceived
2 Bill McKibben quoting an "academic analyst" in "Now or Never: What is an Environmentalist to
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validity of the current state of scientific knowledge on climate change; science that
ties the current fossil fuel based methods of economic growth with irrevocable future
environmental and socio-economic changes. The second most important aspect of a
decision makers beliefs revolve around the role of fossil fuels in economic growth.
The dominant economic growth paradigm is centered around short term economic
growth that mandates fossil fuels as a primary input to growth. An "alternative" belief
is that economic growth and environmental protection can occur simultaneously.
Once domain has been defined through the cognitive maps and the decision
makers corresponding risk tolerance explicated, the dependent variable of policy
preferences are analyzed. Two policy options are analyzed; the business as usual
(BAU) option associated with the status quo and President Bush, as well as a climate
protection policy that is reflective of the emissions reductions associated with US
compliance with Kyoto as negotiated by the Clinton administration. These two policy
options are evaluated in three case studies; the economy wide costs of compliance
with Kyoto targets for greenhouse gas emissions, the public health impacts of
greenhouse gas reductions, and finally against a component of Kyoto that allows for
international trading of permits to emit greenhouse gases.
A best and a worst case possible outcome for each of the two policies are
advanced in order to establish the variance of expected outcomes associated for each
policy. The distribution of economy wide costs of compliance for the protection
policy are widest under the strong science scenario, representing a risky policy option
Do? "In These Times.com. April 30, 2001. Available at
http://www.inthesetimes.com/issue/25/1 I/mckibben2511.html
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that President Clinton preferred under his domain of losses. As a scientific skeptic,
President Bush preferred the narrower variance of cost estimates under the BAD.
Similarly, the variance of expected outcomes for the emission trading aspect of Kyoto
is greater for the protection scenario than for the BAD, a distribution that prospect
theory predicts would appeal to President Bush. The final variable examined is the
public health component of emissions reductions. The variance of expected outcomes
for the protection policy is less than that of the BAD. Prospect theory does not
adequately explain why President Bush would not pursue this less risky policy.
In sum, two of the three case studies examined in this analysis include programs
for C02 abatement that are "risky" compared to the status quo. Given President
Bush's beliefs in the uncertainties associated with climate change science, prospect
theory would explain his pursuit of the less risky BAD policy as a function of his
belief in the benefits of the status quo. President Clinton, as a climate science
adherent, would favor the more risky protection policy as two of three policy variables
are more risky than the BAD scenario. Before we can explain the policy change
between the two administrations, let us first look at the history of the decision to
abandon the Kyoto Protocol.
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2. A Change in Climate Policy: President Bush Abandons the Kyoto Protocol
There is evidence that rather than using formal bureaucratic decision-making
process in his approach to climate policy, President Bush appears to have acted
unilaterally. He opposed the advice given to him by the secretaries of state, treasury,
commerce, and the EPA; the agencies that would have administrative authority over
implementation of any federal greenhouse gas reduction strategies. However, the
position of another key cabinet member, the energy secretary, is unclear. Instead,
President Bush sided with Larry Lindsey, his economic advisor, and other
conservatives "who continue to question the science behind global warming and think
the US should ignore the whole issue"(Dunne, 2001, p. 13).
On March 13, 2001, the President sent a letter to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig
and Roberts that reversed a campaign pledge to regulate C02 emissions from US
power plants. In doing so, he single handedly rejected the Clinton administration's
approach to Kyoto. The administration's decision to officially abandon Kyoto was
announced two weeks later by EPA secretary Whitman on March 27th• In April, only
after these decisions not to regulate greenhouse gases were made, the administration
started holding cabinet level briefings on the economics and science of climate
change.
The Bush decision "was made in an appalling vacuum of information" (Rivkin,
2001) and did not represent a classic governmental decision-making approach.
According to Allison and Zelikow (1999), outcomes from a governmental model of
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decision-making are the result of bargaining games that are formed through competing
interests; where a player stands on an issue is dependent on his or her position within
the government. Compromise between parties is the inevitable result, and in this case
might have manifested itself as a delay to study modifications of Kyoto, a position that
was advanced by the EPA, commerce, treasury and state departments. Instead, Bush
even rejected the cabinet recommendation to insert moderating language into the letter
to the Senators. By refusing to state that the administration opposed C02 regulation
"at this time" (Dunne, 200 I, p. 13), Bush made it appear as ifthere was not going to
be any influence on his decision by the cabinet.
Support for the argument that the President Bush's decision to abandon Kyoto
was largely the result of Presidential discretion and personal initiative could be
supported by Bernstein (2000) and Krasner (1972), among others, who have criticized
Allison's models as being to attached to the decision-making process and paying to
little attention to the president as an individual. Bernstein argues for "focusing on the
president's personality, values, aspirations, hopes and anxieties, and his background to
explain important foreign policy decisions" (p. 162). This analysis responds to these
calls for a greater inclusion of individual presidential traits through the cognitive
mapping exercise. Prospect theory links traditional rational actor models of decision-
making with the actor's beliefs about the reference point from which they evaluate
options.
9
2.1 Decision-making Literature Review
The rational actor model typically is silent on the role of individual beliefs in
decision-making. However, the characteristics of the decision itself are of great
importance in any decision theory. The information available to the decision maker
categorizes the situation as being performed under conditions of either risk or
uncertainty. A situation of risk is one where probabilities of occurrence can be
assigned to outcomes, while uncertainty is categorized as a situation where
probabilities of occurrence are not possible to assign (Elster, 1986, p. 5).
Policymakers typically face situations of uncertainty where probabilities cannot be
assigned to outcomes. For example, legislatures alter policies during conference
committees, implementing agencies face cutbacks or barriers to adoption, and
evaluation processes that affect policy outcomes, are but a few examples of the
conditions of uncertainty that policymakers operate under. Furthermore, policy
decisions are made in a dynamic setting, where new alternative are added during the
decision process (Mintz, Nehemia, Redd, & Carnes, 1997). In sum, the policy
decision-making environment is one of dynamic, often unstructured decisions, made
with less than perfect information about both the scope of policy alternatives available
and the consequences associated with each alternative.
2.1.1 The Dominant Paradigm?: The Rational Choice Model
Rational choice theorists can possible explain President Bush's decision in
March of2001 to abandon the Kyoto Protocol as a result of subjective expected utility
(SEU). SEU posits that decision makers chose options that result in the highest
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expected payout according to some subjective utility function. After all, the Kyoto
Protocol is an international treaty designed to reduce man made emissions of
greenhouse gases, and both the President and Vice President have extensive ties to the
fossil fuel industry and believe that an abundant supply offossil fuels is in the nation's
best interest. Furthermore, both individuals come from states where fossil fuels playa
major role in the local economies, and were heavily supported in the 2000 election by
the fossil fuel industry and other conservative constituencies. A rational actor model
could argue that the decision to abandon Kyoto was done in the President's self
interests.
Self interests are calculated according to the expected utility principle, which is
the basis for the ration choice model of decision- making. The rational model assumes
that each decision-maker has a clearly defined set of alternatives (preferences) and
these alternatives must be able to be ranked. The economic, physical and logical
resources and constraints that define the feasible set are impounded are into this set
and cease to exist externally (Caparaso, 1992, pp. 129-30). In the neoclassical
economic version of rational choice, the actor has gained information on all possible
alternatives and will choose the one best value maximizing alternative (Allison, 1999,
p. 20). Theorists have relaxed this assumption to include only information whose
benefits of collection exceed the costs of doing so (Caparaso, 1992, p. 130). Decision
makers will then choose the path with the highest expected utility according to some
subjective utility function. Economists have clung to this normative model with
tenacity, in spite of overwhelming evidence that humans do not behave the way the
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model predicts. Organizational theorists were quick to notice that human behavior in
organizations was anything but rational and offered compelling alternatives to the
rational choice theory.
Herbert Simon offered the most enduring and quoted alternative to the rational
actor model, bounded rationality. Simon held that while intendedly rational, humans
operate under a condition of bounded rationality which recognizes the constraints that
individuals face in gathering information on alternatives as well as the information
processing constraints of individuals. Instead of preparing an exhaustive list of
alternatives, individuals only pursue a limited search and select the most familiar
alternative, "satisficing" rather than maximizing (Simon, 1976, March & Simon,
1958). Simon makes a cogent argument that decision-making is intendedly rational,
however in actuality these constraints result in behavior that is far from rational.
2.1.2 Prospect Theory
Prospect theory (PT) can provide an alternative rival hypotheses to rational
choice explanations of presidential behavior. The rational theory of choice is a
normative model of idealized decision-making and according to Kahneman and
Tversky (1979), does not provide an adequate foundation for a descriptive theory of
decision-making. Developed by Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman and others over a
two decade period, PT "renders rational choice models descriptively vacuous,
empirically static, and normatively bankrupt" (McDermott, 1998, pp. 14). PT's
central assertion is that the expected value of a policy is a product of the probability of
occurrence adjusted by a probability weighting function and the utility of this outcome
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is filtered through a value function (Haas, 2001, p. 247). This value function means
that individual utility is based on a reference point where expected outcomes above
this point are evaluated as gains, and outcomes below are evaluated as losses, a
phenomenon known as "reference dependence".
Furthermore, notice that the slope of the value function is steeper for losses in
Figure 1: Prospect Theory Value Function
Value
Losses Gains
Adapkd from Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 200
This asymmetry means that risk perceptions vary according to domain. PT maintains
that individuals might be risk averse when evaluating gains but that they are risk
seeking when evaluating losses. Thus, an individual's perception of risk depends on
whether the outcomes are perceived as gains or losses, relative to the starting point and
that losses will loom larger than gains. Empirical tests of loss aversion are extensive
and robust (Kahneman, et aI., 1991). Loss aversion means that the loss of utility of
giving up good is larger than the utility of gaining a comparable good and results in an
over evaluation of current possessions known as the "endowment effect". Empirical
tests show strong support for this effect (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Kahneman, et
al., 1991). This loss aversion implies a preference for the status quo, known as the
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"status quo bias", instead of options with the same expected value (Quattrone &
Tversky, 1988, pp. 722-4).
The interaction of the asymmetry between gains and losses and the role of the
reference point means that altering the framing of a decision can lead to reversals in
preferences (Levy, 1997, p. 90). This violates the invariance principle of expected
utility theory which states that for rational actors the preference order of outcomes
should not vary depending on how their outcomes and probabilities are described. PT
offers a means of comparing and predicting behavior across individuals depending on
the context of the decision criteria; gains versus losses relative to the reference point,
and how and if the assets of decision maker will be affected. Prospect theory is not a
prescriptive, normative theory. Rather, it is a prospective theory that is predictively
powerful and descriptively accurate (McDermott, 1998, p. 14). The importance of
loss aversion and its effects on how an option is framed has profound implications for
GHG mitigation policies in the US.
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3. Background
Carbon dioxide (C02) is seemingly a very innocuous gas. Human being
exhale it with every breath and it has been a by-product of civilization since humans lit
their first campfire. But as demand for electricity and transportation increase in an
industrializing society grows, so do emissions of carbon dioxide. Carbon from beneath
the earth's surface in the form of oil, coal and gas is burned by industrial and
consumer activities and released into the common pool resource known as the
biosphere. Global greenhouse gas emissions are over six billion tons of carbon a year
and this increase in the amount of atmospheric gases results in more of the sun's
energy being trapped within the atmosphere rather being radiated back into space.
The US is responsible for about one fourth of global anthropogenic greenhouse gas
emissions. If the U.S. were to reduce its greenhouse gas output to something near its
Kyoto commitment under Clinton, it will need to reduce its annual carbon dioxide
output by approximately 562 million tons of carbon by 2010 (Bernow, et ai, 1999).
The magnitude of the cuts necessary to meet Kyoto highlight the changes in
climate policy between the two administrations. For the purposes of this analysis,
policy change will be defined in three areas. The first policy is the abandonment of
Kyoto by President Bush. The Clinton administration negotiated and supported the
treaty, but ratification was jeopardized by a unanimous 1997 Senate resolution
opposing any international agreement that exempted developing countries from
mandatory emissions reductions. Secondly, is regulation of the electricity policy. The
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Bush administration's Clean Skies Initiative is widely regarded as a continuation of
the status quo, essentially allowing unlimited emissions in the future (Pianin, 2002).
In addition, the Bush administration is attempting to roll back regulation of retrofits of
old coal plants that were grandfathered into the Clean Air Act Amendments, creating
conditions for even cheaper and dirtier fossil fuel sources of electricity. The EPA
under the Clinton administration had been pursuing coal fired electricity generators
that retrofitted old plants with new equipment yet avoided the emission requirements
of new plants. Also, the administration has rolled back Clinton's higher standards for
air conditioners, has tried to relax the Army Corp of Engineer's mountaintop coal
mining rules, reversed a campaign pledge to regulate C02 emissions from power
plants, and increased the number of voluntary as opposed to mandatory programs for
C02 reductions. The final dissimilarity between the two administrations is in
transportation policy. Clinton claimed to be in favor oftighter CAFE' standards for
fuel efficiency while Bush has not supported this policy. These three broad issue areas
would comprise a national climate protection policy to reduce GHG emissions.
3.1 Climate Policy Architecture and Implementation
These policies would most likely be supplemented by a national emissions
trading regime that has been examined in some detail in the Airlie Carbon Trading
Papers and Hargrave (1998, 2000). These papers were developed by the "Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Trading Braintrust" assembled by the Center for Clean Air Policy
which is a group of high level representatives from industry, environmental
organizations, state and federal governments and academia. The Airlie Papers
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explicate policy considerations surrounding the design and implementation of a carbon
allowance regime.
According to the Airlie Papers, two broad types of policy options exist for an
economy wide carbon trading regime. The first type is an "upstream" approach under
a cap and trade regime where allowances to emit greenhouse gases are allocated or
auctioned at the level of the primary fuel producers; petroleum refineries, oil
importers, gas pipelines and processors. These producers would be required to
possess allowances representing one ton (or metric tonne) of greenhouse gas emissions
of their products. Low carbon fuel producers such as gas processors would have to
hold fewer allowances per unit of sales than would petroleum or coal fuel processors.
Their excess allowances could be sold to firms requiring more carbon allowances, thus
reducing the relative price of low carbon fuels.
The second policy option is a "downstream" approach which requires all users
offossil fuels to surrender allowances to emit GHGs. With about 380,000
manufacturing sites across the country and millions of cars and houses, using a
strictly downstream approach is considered impractical. However, large downstream
sources such as electric power generators are relatively few in number (2500),
stationary, and these units could be monitored relatively easily. Combining a
downstream approach for electricity generators, and perhaps large industrial sources,
with an upstream approach for the rest of the economy has been dubbed a "hybrid"
approach and is considered the most likely form for a GHG emissions trading regime
to be implemented in the US.
17
Domestic Opposition
It is due to the magnitude of the US emissions reductions associated with fossil
fuel combustion that makes the Kyoto Protocol unique among international treaties.
Domestic reductions in fossil fuel use would impact a large portion of the US
economy and radically affect the current energy infrastructure and industry. As much
as international relations scholars like to assume states are unitary, rational actors at
the negotiating table, experienced diplomats argue otherwise (Strauss, 1987). As
Putnam (1988) argues, international negotiations involve the satisfaction of two sets of
interests; domestic political and economic constituencies must be satisfied, as well as
maintaining key international relationships through negotiations.
Putnam notes that both levels need to be heeded by decision-makers as long as
their countries remain interdependent. Interdependence is an often-used term but
needs a working definition. Snyder and Diesing (1977) define it as "the parties are
dependent on each other for the preservation or realization of important values" (p.
170). One goal of this analysis is to explicate how the Bush administration did not
share the same values as that of the other industrialized nations. As we define the
domain that the Bush administration operates under, two variables should become
clear: I) the administration questions the existence and severity of global warming,
and 2) that fossil fuels are perceived as too important to economic growth to regulate.
The US rejection of Kyoto is not unique among OECD countries. Australia
has also indicated that it will not ratify the treaty and the Canadian government is
having trouble overcoming opposition from energy intensive industries and fossil fuel
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extractive regions. Climate policy is difficult to enact because of the characteristics of
the issue area. The combination of the ambiguous scientific nature of this problem,
along with the magnitude ofthe use of the polluting input continues to hamper
progressive climate policy implementation globally. Comparing these scientific and
economic aspects of Kyoto to the Montreal Protocol on ozone depleting substances
can provide an illustration of these phenomena.
3.2 Comparison of the Kyoto Protocol to the Montreal Protocol
As early as the mid 1970' s, the scientific community was aware that the ozone
layer was diminishing. By the early 1980's, the combination of regulatory action and
voluntary industry activities had reduced the production of ozone depleting substances
(CFCs) by about 20% from their peak of a decade earlier. The initial target of a 50%
reduction of these substances under the Montreal Protocol was increased to a total
production ban (by industrialized nations) in the final 1986 agreement after a NASA
expedition brought back definitive proof of a hole in the ozone layer (Bryner, 1997,
pp.29-34).
The contrast of the "smoking gun" hole in the ozone layer to the gradual and
quasi-attributable effects of global climate change couldn't be starker. While not a
simple problem, the complexity of the ozone hole pales in comparison to the
intricacies of climatology. Since the Bush administration abandoned the Kyoto
Protocol, 2000 people have died in monsoon floods in Asia, the Chinese government
has announce that it will spend billions to halt desertification outside Beijing, Europe
has seen the worst floods in centuries, two huge chunks of the Antarctic Ice sheet have
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calved off, the worst forest fires in history have devastated the Western US, bark
beetles have killed pine trees worth billions of dollars in Alaska and the Northwest,
and the West Nile virus has killed and terrified vulnerable residents across this
country. All ofthese events are consistent with what the climate models predict for
global warming.' However, none of these events can be definitively attributed to the
one-degree rise in global temperatures that we have experienced. Alternative rival
hypothesis abound for each of these complex phenomena. As Jasonoff (\ 993) states;
When it comes to studying the causes of complex environmental problems, there is
almost always more than one way to skin the scientific cat. And these choices are
not themselves scientific. They're deeply social, cultural, and ethical (p. 155).
This inability to define a clear scientific link between these tragic events and our
warmer world is preventing the environmental community from moving the climate
change issue to the forefront of the US policy agenda.
If the lack of a smoking gun is preventing policy action, so to is the importance
of fossil fuels as economic inputs compared to CFCs under the Montreal Protocol.
CFCs and their replacements are used primarily in refrigeration and some
manufacturing processes which limits their penetration in the economy to a relatively
small industry. Contrast this with fossil fuels; the coal, oil, and gas industries
combined are a trillion dollar a year industry. When combined with the automotive
industry it becomes apparent that a modem economy's very foundation is fossil fuels.
3 See the US National Assessment hy the US Glohal Change Research Program at
http://www.usgcrp.gov/usgcrp/nacc/default.htm
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Not only does the discrepancy between the economic goods under regulation in
the two treaties become apparent, there exists substantial differences in the availability
of substitute goods. The US refrigeration industry signed onto Montreal after they had
discovered a cost effective substitute to CFCs. The fact that the US industry that
would be regulated under the treaty developed a new product, when European CFC
manufacturers had not, is commonly viewed as a major explanatory variable for US
support of the Treaty under the Reagan administration (Bryner, 1997, p. 33).
However, cost effective substitutes for fossil fuels are not readily available. While
electricity generated from wind turbines can be competitive with new fossil fuel
generation, it is available as a generation resource only in certain parts of the US. No
new sources of electricity can compete with old coal plants whose equipment has been
fully depreciated, giving it a major cost advantage. Only energy efficiency and
conservation can compete with old coal as a source of "new" generation (Nelson,
2002). In the transportation sector the availability of cost effective substitutes for the
internal combustion engine are bleak. Thus, Kyoto suffers in comparison with the
Montreal Protocol again, this time because of differences in the availability of
commercialized cost effective substitutes.
The final disparity between these two international environmental agreements
has to do with the effects on state sovereignty from ratification. Remember that the
Reagan administration was not concerned about US ability to comply with Montreal's
required reductions of CFCs because of the existence of CFC substitutes. However,
only a few ardent environmentalists have argued that US compliance with Kyoto
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would be easy. Therefore, at the time of the its abandonment of Kyoto it is possible
that the Bush administration believed that if the US had ratified Kyoto and then was
not able to meet its targets it would have been liable for potentially unlimited financial
liability under Article 18 of the Kyoto Protocol. Article 18 is a rather vague paragraph
that defers compliance criteria to future meetings. Subsequently, the Conference of
the Parties to the Protocol decided that excess emissions from the first period ending
2008-2012 would have to be made up in the next compliance period, plus a 30%
penalty." This is not a light sentence, but neither is it the death penalty as the benefits
of electricity standards and investments in new technologies for clean energy and
transportation in the first compliance period would be reaping emissions reductions
benefits in the next period.
While this paper is not expressly concerned with the effects of Kyoto
compliance on US sovereignty, this is clearly an important issue that needs to be
analyzed in future research. This analysis cannot rule out that these concerns did not
materially impact the administration's decision on the issue. A risk averse
administration operating under the domain of gains is certainly not going to
experiment with potentially expensive and invasive international treaties if it does not
believe the threat posed by climate change is significant. However, in many ways the
concern about national sovereignty complement the two variables under examination
in this paper. If, as this paper maintains, the risk averse Bush administration quit the
Kyoto process because compliance required too many risky policies then the
sovereignty issue would be similarly risky to the emissions trading and economic
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policies associated with ratification and compliance. This paper does not explicitly
consider sovereignty due to a lack of publicly available data from the administration
on the issue. Nor does the sovereignty problem lend itself to a cost-benefit analysis
and estimates of the variance of expected outcomes, the favored methodology for the
more quantifiable policies under examination.
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4. Prospect Theory Analysis of Domain
The goal in delineating the discrepancies between the Montreal and Kyoto
Protocols is to help define important variables in the political economy of climate
policy. The differences in both scientific certainty ofthe underlying phenomenon as
well as the availability of cost effective substitute goods explains much of the
differences in outcomes between the two treaties. Because of the importance of these
factors they will be used to define domain in this analysis. For us to understand the
shift in policy from the Clinton to the Bush administration, we need to contrast the two
administrations' views on the issue of global climate change with the goal of
delineating the type of domain each administration believed itself to be under. Once
we have assessed the domain, the independent variable, we can explain and predict the
subsequent riskiness ofthe dependent variable of the options that each administration
pursued.
Thus, for this analysis domain is defined in two categories. First, we need to
explicate each decision maker's beliefs about the role of fossil fuels in the US
economy. Second, each President's statements on the science of climate change are
considered as each decision maker's beliefs about the robustness of the science and the
long-term threat posed to society by climate change determines the domain that the
individual operates under. Other categories of belief elements were considered and
then excluded due to methodological reasons. For example, it is tempting to include
the beliefs of each president on the regulation of the economy. However, this belief
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also reflects a subsequent policy preference. Domain and the risk tolerance of
subsequent policy alternatives need to be evaluated independently to avoid
tautological reasoning (McDermott, 1998). By delineating each man's beliefs only
about science and fossil fuels, this type of circular reasoning can hopefully be avoided.
It is difficult to overstate the importance of fossil fuels to modern economies.
Daniel Yergin, with a gift for understatement claims, " ... [P]etroleum remains the
motivating force of industrial society and the lifeblood of the civilization that it helped
create" (\ 992, p. 779). This is especially true in the US where the regulatory
environment is especially friendly to fossil fuel consumption. Figure 2 shows that the
price of unleaded gas in the US is less than one half that of other industrialized
countries (retail petrol prices for India and China are not available), primarily because
oflow energy taxes. Because ofthe low cost of fossil fuels as an economic input, the
US relies on these sources of cheap energy, and their corresponding greenhouse gas
emissions. The average American is responsible for double the C02 emissions of
their European counterpart, and 20 times that of an Indian citizen.
The entire US socio-economic structure has benefited from cheap fossil fuels.
In fact, cheap fossil fuels might even be considered a part of American cultural
"mythology"; Route 66, cruising, huge dream homes, muscle cars, and SUVs are
mostly viewed as positives for mainstream American culture and each requires a
source of cheap energy. The status quo consists oflow energy taxes, low-cost
imported oil, and cheap domestic coal. These regulatory choices have provided cheap
energy inputs and therefore the status quo is viewed favorably. In
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Figure 2: Comparative Fuel Cost and Emissions Data (source: lEA, 2002)
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prospect theory terms, this is important because states that benefit under current
conditions will be in a gains frame (Berjekian, 1997, p. 792). One of the assumptions
of this paper is that, ceteris paribus, the US has benefited from the status quo oflow
cost energy inputs as a reference point and is therefore in the domain of gains as the
default condition.
In social science terms, the status quo would be defined as the dominant social
paradigm. For the mainstream consumer society of the US this paradigm could be
considered "frontier economics" which is characteristic of the unlimited resources of a
society with an open frontier (Porter and Brown, 1991, p. 27). The foundation ofthis
societal view is fundamentally exclusionist, in that it excludes human beings from the
laws of nature. It is based on the assumptions of neoclassical economics; markets
allocate scarce resources most efficiently, and that there is an infinite supply of natural
resources as well as sinks to dispose of human waste. Human beings can avoid
resource depletion by allowing the price of scarce resources to rise until technology
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can supply substitute goods. Similarly, waste disposal is something to be considered
ex post facto.
However, this dominant social paradigm has come under attack by an
"alternative" view. Sustainable economic development recognizes that the current
system does not impound the externalities into prices of goods and services, nor does
it protect public goods such the atmosphere, rivers and oceans. It is not a coincidence
that the vanguard of this alternative paradigm is "alternative" energy; biofuels and
renewables that minimize the long-term negative externalities and damage to the
commons. A cornerstone of this paradigm is its call for long term decision-making.
Dubbed intergenerational equity, it is the concern that the current generation's
economic policies will jeopardize the ability of future generations to increase their
standard of living because of either polluted common areas or depleted resources.
Sustainable development's concern for future generations and for the global commons
is what distinguishes it from the status quo and the exclusionist paradigm. The
difference between Presidents Clinton and Bush is how each viewed this reference
point of the status quo. Perceptions of their reference point is a function of each
individual's ideology and beliefs and how it affects their ability to assimilate new
information that might conflict with existing beliefs, preferences and policies.
4.1 Elite Ideology and Beliefs
Explicating a definition of elite political ideology has challenged scholars for
years. Putnam (1971) has defined it as some identifiable characteristics or set of
characteristics of political actors; a small set of explicable principles that guide an
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individual's thinking and behavior in a wide variety of situations. Kritzer (1978),
following Converse (1964), operationalizes ideology as the stable, highly structured
interrelationships among belief elements or attitudes (groups of belief elements) of
elites. Kritzer's model composed of belief elements and their interrelationships
utilized survey questions to measure ideology. For this analysis a different data
gathering model needs to be used, given the lack of access to administration officials.
Instead, this paper utilizes Axelrod's (1976) cognitive mapping model consisting of
concepts and causal beliefs. Confusing terminology aside, Axelrod's concepts act as
variables akin to belief elements, while causal beliefs are the relationships between
variables.
A total of 26 speeches dealing with climate change were analyzed to explicate
domain, 13 for each president. To operationalize domain cognitive maps were
constructed according to the coding rules explicated by Wrightson (1976). The
procedure is to first identify important variables, then to identify which variable is the
cause and which is the effect variable, then determine whether the relationship
between the variables is positive (+), negative (-), no relationship (0), or indeterminate
(?). Thus, the cognitive map is a collection of: Cause Concept ~ Linkage ~ Effect
Concept for the policy variable under consideration. The appendix contains a full
description of the methodology employed in this analysis.
4.2 Analysis: Comparison of Presidential Belief Systems
This paper argues that the two most important aspects of a climate policy
decision makers' domains are his beliefs about the state of the science of climate
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change, as well as beliefs about the role of fossil fuels in economic growth. Most
importantly, the science is what links the emission of greenhouse gases from the
burning of fossil fuels with the negative consequences of climate warming: sea level
rise, more extreme weather events such as hurricanes, increased droughts and
flooding, human health problems from the increase in vector born diseases such as
malaria, hantavirus and W. Nile virus, etc. In climate policy decision-making, it is
science that is the link between the antecedent path of greenhouse gas emissions and
the consequence path of global warming. "Science, not aroused by public opinion or
economic interest groups, has been the prime political mover behind most global
environmental issues." (Rosenbaum, 1998, p. 344). Peer reviewed science may be the
closest thing to an "objective" source of information that is available to a policy
maker.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is comprised of 2500
scientists and represents the largest peer reviewed scientific effort in history. In 1995
the IPCC stated that "The balance of evidence suggests a discernible human influence
on global climate" and in 200 I concluded, "There is new and stronger evidence that
most of the warming observed over the last 50 years is attributable to human
activities .." (IPCC, 2001, p.IO). The IPCC projects that the coming century will bring
temperature increase of 1.4 to 5.8 degrees Celsius, barring significant changes in
consumer and industrial behavior. Yet, in spite of the billions of dollars of scientific
research, the earth's climatic system is undoubtedly one of the most complex systems
to understand. While the IPCC believes that part of the .6 degree Celsius warming of
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the last century is due to anthropogenic activity and not due to natural variation,
uncertainties still exist regarding the magnitude of the changes and the role of cloud
formations in future warming.
The Bush administration revealed its views about the state of the science when
it asked the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences to review
the IPCC reports. In addition to identifying areas of certainties and uncertainties in the
science, the White House was also concerned that there was a bias between the full
IPCC reports which are approximately 1,000 pages, and the 20 page summaries for
policy makers. Climate skeptics have argued that the scientists ofIPCC were
displaying scare tactics to make the public and policy makers believe that the problem
was worse than the science says it was.
The National Research Council (2001b) squelched these rumors, stating "no
changes were made [in the SPM] without the consent of the convening lead authors
and that most changes that did occur lacked significant impact" (p. 23). On the issue
of uncertainties, the NAS notes, "The changes observed over the last several decades
are likely mostly due to human activities, but we cannot rule out that some significant
part of these changes is also a reflection of natural variability" (p. I).
Given this brief synopsis of climate science, let us turn to each president's
stated beliefs about climate change. The contrast in the stated beliefs by the two
presidents about climate science could not be more polarized. President Bush stated
that he believes that climate policy initiative should be based on "sound science" and
has described the scientific community as having "differing opinions" and the state of
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climate science as "uncertain" and possessing an "incomplete state of knowledge".
The interpretation of these comments is that since the science is uncertain and policies
should be based on "sound" science, only limited action should be undertaken until the
science Improves.
In contrast, President Clinton argues that the scientific evidence is "not all that
controversial", rather he argued on November 11,2000, the evidence is "clear that
this projected warming threatens serious harm to our environment and to our
economy. It could mean more flooding, more droughts, more extreme weather, and a
serious disruption in water supplies." Clinton nearly always listed the forecasted
negative impacts of a warmer climate and used the word "risk" and "threat"
repeatedly. In other talks he clearly defines the linkage between fossil fuel use,
greenhouse gas emissions and climate change, links that President Bush has not
explicitly made in this collection of statements. As close as Bush got to linking this
antecedent to a consequence path was on January 18,2001 when he acknowledged
that "human activities are a significant factor in climate change, and that climate
change is likely to have many negative impacts on our environment and society."
President Bush never mentions what those negative impacts are; flooding, droughts,
and other predicted consequences are not included in any of his statements available to
this researcher.
Figures 3 and 4 provide cognitive maps for Presidents Clinton and Bush
respectively. The differences in their beliefs about the state of the science are
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manifested in the upper right quadrant ofthe cognitive maps of each President. For
Clinton, the linkage between climate science and environmental protection is positive
(+) while for Bush in Figure 4 it is undefined (7). Furthermore, the concept that
science serves as a connection between fossil fuel use and negative outcomes is also
manifest as undefined for Bush. In contrast, Clinton clearly believes what scientists
say about the positive ties between carbon based fuels and environmental and socio-
economic damage from global warming. The bottom middle of each map shows the
respective relationship for each President between fossil fuel use and the negative
consequences of climate change.
Figure 3: Cognitive Map for President Clinton
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S This is the only clear statement that acknowledges the negative consequence of "human activity" by
President Bush. Bush gave this talk at a Department of Energy event on energy efficiency standards
while it was still under Clinton era leadership that most likely contributed to the content of the speech.
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The second way that this paper defines domain are the decision makers' beliefs
about the role offossil fuels in the economy. Fossil fuels have been responsible for
historical patterns of industrialization and economic growth, otherwise known as the
status quo. Clinton's map shows a neutral relationship between fossil fuel use (thick
line in the center of Figure 3) while Bush believes in a strong positive relationship
between the two. This central belief affects the relationship of many other belief
elements. Bush's statements are centered around the concept that environmental
protection will come after, or as a result of economic growth and increased wealth.
His belief is manifest as positive relationship from economic growth to environmental
protection. In constrast, Clinton's beliefthat environmental protection and investment
in renewable resources would cause economic growth is manifest as a positive
relationship between the two as well. However, the direction of the linkage between
these two concepts is different for each decision maker, indicating opposite antecedent
and consequence paths. President Bush's beliefs don't include the fact that, according
to the science, any future economic growth using historical types of energy
consumption wi11lead to environmental degradation, not protection. His
aforementioned inability to connect economic growth using fossil fuels and their
corresponding GHGs with global warming is central to explaining Bush's domain.
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Figure 4: Cognitive Map of President Bush
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In his statements, President Bush repeatedly suggests two things: a belief that
technology will be able to solve the problem of global warming, and that this will
(+)
happen at some time in the future. Remember that these are two elements of the
exclusionist paradigm. As an example, on February 21, 2002 he put it this way, "wise
[economic] growth is something that happens in the future." This approach is
reminiscent of an old Brazilian saying, "Brazil is the country of the future, and always
will be." Without a time line for action, or agreed on adaptive management triggers for
policy action to offset environmental problems, the dominant paradigm relies on the
human penchant of being resistant to change for its continued supremacy.
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This discrepancy between the two presidents in their perception of temporal
elements is critical. After all, the conceptualization of time is one of the paramount
differences between the dominant paradigm and the alternative one that this analysis
argues each president represents. Sustainable economic development has been defined
as "development that meets the needs ofthe present without compromising the ability
of future generations to meet their needs" (World Commission of Environment and
Development, 1987). Under this paradigm, policy makers must explicitly consider the
future. The status quo relies on maximizing returns in the current period, without
explicit consideration of future income or conditions.
At the end of nearly every one of Clinton's comments was a request to
consider our children when considering climate policy and this is impounded in his
cognitive map as the negative relationship between fossil fuels and the future costs of
climate change. President Bush's statements show little regard for the future and
therefore his cognitive map indicates an uncertain relationship between fossil fuel use
and future costs.
These two maps contrast the two individual differences in beliefs about the
robustness of climate science as well as the role of fossil fuels in the economy. These
two cognitive maps have been developed in order to advance the theory that each
decision maker operated under differing domains. When comparing the domains of
these two men, there are four important factors to consider. First, in prospect theory
terms, President Bush conceptually would have been operating along the value
function in the upper right quadrant of the hypothetical value function in Figure 1.
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Conversely, President Clinton's domain would have been along the line in the lower
left section. Secondly, prospect theory allows for an individual's expectations to help
define their domain. While in many cases, expected gains or losses from potential
alternatives are evaluated against the reference point of the status quo, it is also
possible that gains or losses are compared relative to an expectation or aspiration level
that differs from the status quo. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) use the example of an
entrepreneur that is experiencing a business downturn with greater success than his
competitors. He might evaluate a small loss as a gain, as opposed to the expected
larger loss (p. 286). In this case, Clinton's expectation would have been that the gains
from business as usual development are overwhelmed by the future costs from a
changing climate, putting him in the domain oflosses.
The third factor to consider is that comparing the domain of two such disparate
individuals as Presidents Clinton and Bush is difficult from a methodological
standpoint. Such a comparison is enhanced by a benchmark to compare each of them
against. Berejekian (1992, 1997) proposes a "social frame" which he defines as "the
perception that participation in the existing socio-structural arrangement implies either
gains or losses" (p. 792). Perhaps for this analysis, the term "policy frame" might be
more appropriate. This policy frame would include our two primary variables; the
role of fossil fuels in economic growth as well as views about the robustness of
climate science. Clinton's policy frame led him to believe that current conditions
were unacceptable and negative consequences would result from a continuation ofthe
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status quo. In contrast, President Bush did not share these beliefs and thus associated
the status quo with continued gains.
The final factor to contemplate is how Clinton's beliefs about the policy frame
changed sometime prior to 1998. His current beliefs differ from what this paper
argues is the default condition of business as usual fossil fuel development. While an
explication of his beliefs over time is beyond the limitations this paper, President
Clinton would have had to have impounded into his belief system new information
such as the 1990 and 1995 IPCC reports as well as significant developments in
renewable energy and conservation. This new information could cause a
renormalization of his reference point from the gains previously associated with the
status quo to losses from a continuation of it. Prospect theory predicts that there will
be a time lag in this renormalization from gains to losses. Remember that the
"endowment effect" holds that people will overvalue what they currently hold
(including beliefs), which will lead to resistance to change. Additionally, loss
aversion predicts that it might take longer for people to renormalize their reference
point to include losses. Thus, one explanation for the differences in beliefs between
the two presidents, is that President Clinton renormalized more quickly than President
Bush in the face of new information. The limitations of prospect theory in addressing
why one decision maker might renormalize more quickly than another is addressed in
the final section. Given these differences in domain between decision makers, the next
section explicates the subsequent riskiness of each President's policy preferences.
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5. Prospect Theory Analysis of Risk Tolerance
The previous section defined the domains in which each administration operated
under. According to prospect theory, if the Bush administration is in the domain of
gains as this paper argues, then risk aversion leads to policy changes that are at most
incremental. In contrast, meaningful policy change occurs when policymakers are
placed in the domains of losses, increasing their risk tolerances and opening up new
policy alternatives. The cognitive map for President Clinton maintains that he was
operating under the domain oflosses. The decision makers operating under this
domain should have been risk seeking in its efforts to implement climate protections
policies.
Clinton, given his belief in the robustness of the science should then argue for
economic development founded on lesser polluting sources of energy. As prospect
theory tells us, any policies to move away from the status quo will only be undertaken
by those operating under a domain of losses that believe that the status quo is
unacceptable.
For this analysis then, risk tolerance is the dependent variable, and it is evaluated
in terms of the variance of expected outcomes. If the best and worst outcomes of A
are better than the best and worst outcomes of B then A is the more rational choice:
Using this strategy, it becomes possible to compare policies in term of variance
in outcomes values without having to precisely determine a decision makers
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subjective probabilities, and without having to risk tautology in the definition
of risk. (McDermott, 1998, p. 40).
This analysis ranks the distribution of outcomes for three of the most important
aspects of a climate protection policy: the economy wide costs, a mechanism that
allows polluters to trade permits to pollute, and finally the public health aspects of
greenhouse gas reductions.
5.1 Climate Policy Scenarios: Business-as-Usual vs. Protection
For federal climate policy, an increase in risk tolerance equates to abandoning
the status quo of business- as-usual (BAD) and adopting plans to first stop increases of
GHG's and then to actually reduce emissions. This will be called the climate
protection scenario, which contrasts with the risk averse BAD scenario. Some key
. components of a climate protection policy in the transport sector include: the
strengthening of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, tax credits for
the purchase of efficient cars and trucks, the increased use of biofuels, and federal
investment in large-scale mass transit. For the electricity sector, mitigation policies
usually focus on a national standard for the use of renewable sources of electricity, a
transition from coal to gas fired sources of electricity as an interim stage towards
renewables, a tax on the carbon content of fuels used to make electricity (with
revenues used to reduce payroll taxes), and tighter building codes and appliance
energy standards. This paper examines the policy options open to any administration
as "ideal types" that are either the BAD case or the climate protection case. Analyzing
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the two scenarios as ideal types allows for intellectual clarity on the relative merits of
each.
This section analyzes three policy case studies using cost-benefit analyses. By
examining the expected variance of positive and negative returns of three policy
scenarios, we are able to understand both the Clinton and Bush administrations'
approach to climate policy. Because ofthe complex nature of the scientific issues
involved and the reliance of modem economies on fossil fuels, this analysis looks at
the economy wide costs and benefits of Kyoto under the domain of both the climate
science adherent and the scientific skeptic. Second, is an analysis of the emissions
trading component of Kyoto as well as the mechanism known as joint implementation
that allows industrialized countries to develop and receive credit for emissions
reductions projects undertaken in lesser developed countries (LDCs). The final policy
area analyzed in this paper is public health and the externalities associated with fossil
fuel sources of energy.
5.1.1 Economy-Wide Cost Of Kyoto Compliance
The variance of outcomes for the status quo (BAD) is easy to determine in the
short run for those policy makers operating under a domain of gains and with
skepticism towards climate science. The best outcome is a continuation of the
economic growth that relies on cheap fossil fuel inputs. The worst outcome would be
a hugely expensive program that ultimately would be unnecessary if global warming
doesn't pose significant socio-economic risks. Recent efforts to model the costs of
compliance with the Kyoto Protocol have utilized computer models called computable
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general equilibrium (CGE) models. These models are composed of at least two
modules that utilize either top-down and/or bottom-up approaches. Top-down models
describe economic behavior based on statistical and theoretical approaches, and
provide a look at the economy as a whole, based on analysis of the principal economic
sectors impacted by primary energy use. Top-down analyses use the independent
variables of GDP growth, population, prices, and investment levels as inputs, along
with price changes due to carbon constraints, and try to determine how price effects,
income effects, investment effects and structural and technical change will affect the
dependent variable, demand for energy use and its corresponding C02 emissions
(lEA, 1998).
Bottom-up models incorporate technological and engineering data and
principals, including market penetration and technology cost data, to model economic
activity in key energy intensive subsectors of the economy, transportation, residential,
commercial and industrial. The forecasted demand for energy use, along with its C02
emissions are the dependent variables. In equilibrium models the relationship between
markets is captured through the market clearing process. A change in the price of one
fuel will affect the price of other fuels. The market will have said to clear when the
model sets prices for all markets so that demand equals supply (Petonsk, Dudek &
Goffman, 1998, p. 140).
Top Down Models
In its assessment of six CGE models, the EIA attempted to reconcile the
differences between estimated costs of compliance with the Protocol that ranged from
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$221 to $348 in 2010 and $147 to $360 in 2020. Carbon permit prices are per metric
ton in 1996 dollars without annex 1 trading, sinks and offsets (EIA, 1999). The
dramatic differences in price between the models are due to differing assumptions
regarding the models' variables.
• Assumptions regarding baseline (reference) GDP estimates and GDP
growth rates: estimates that are relatively high will increase the carbon
reduction requirements and corresponding marginal costs.
• Similarly, assumptions about the amount of lead-time decision makers
have to implement the climate policy significantly affect abatement costs.
If the model begins compliance in 1990, it could understate adjustment
costs.
• Assumptions about nuclear power plant retirement and relicensing: if no
nuclear plants are retired by 2020 about 40 million metric tons of carbon
(MMTC) would be avoided.
• The model's assumptions about the timing and costs of the transition
process for labor and capital given compliance with Kyoto. Assuming
immediate factor substitution will understate the costs.
• The model's sophistication in dis-aggregating technology that might affect
energy efficiency and structural changes in the economy; the existence
and/or extent of "no-regrets" policies.
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• The assumed price elasticities of demand by consumers of energy. Higher
assumed elasticities enable consumers to respond quickly to changes in
pnces.
As one can see from these assumptions, small differences can result in large variations
in estimated carbon allowance prices. The different models exhibit wide variance in
compliance costs when projected over time. The models that emphasize techoological
change show the highest carbon prices early in implementation which are followed by
declining prices. Non techoology focused models show the highest prices later as
techoology improvements do not meet demand requirements. The highest costs of
compliance are generated with these simplistic top-down models that operate under
the assumption that restrictions (price increases) on energy as an economic input will
translate automatically as lost GOP. This assumption discounts human ingenuity,
techoological improvements and our ability to adapt to price increases. Therefore,
these models assume that any opportunities for cost effective energy savings have
already been exploited since energy markets are fully competitive. "No regrets"
saving opportunities are minimal under these models. 6
Bottom Up and Hybrid Models
The arguments for zero cost compliance with the Protocol comes from demand
side advocates who argue that micro-economic assumptions regarding individual and
finn behavior are too pessimistic and therefore top down models suffer from a lack of
6 Skeptics who argue that the global warming problem is not serious enough to warrant more aggressive
mitigation strategies usually reference the top-down, econometric models that show the highest costs of
compliance with Kyoto, as we shall analyze later in this paper, to justify their "negative cost" policies.
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realism. Top down models assume that producers and consumers are rational and well
informed which will ensure that all possible cost saving actions are taken. However,
when individuals exhibit "bounded rationality" they will make economic decisions
that are not optimal, resulting in disequilibrium between competitive supply and
demand forces. The difficulties in obtaining a global optimization that encompasses
the entire opportunity set a decision maker faces have been expanded upon in Herbert
A. Simon's seminal work Models of Bounded Rationality (1997).
In addition to questioning the perfect rationality of economic actors, some
scholars have raised objections to the assumption of perfect information and other
assumptions of a free market. Lovins (1997) poses certain "obstacles" to the market
capitalizing on all neutral and negative cost energy savings opportunities:
• Capital misallocation: in choosing capital allocations between energy
generation and conservation, retail decision makers require a payback
period of several years whereas utilities' make capital investments based
on a 20-30 year project lifespan. This discrepancy makes us invest in
generation rather than efficiency. Similarly, investments are made
according to first cost basis rather than life-cycle costs. The contractor
who offers the lowest bid usually gets the contract, and often times the
lowest bid doesn't include low loss wires which provide an annual rate of
return of 169%.
Ironically, these models that they reference assume that negative cost options don't exist because they
would have already been exploited.
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• Organizational failures: energy savings for a department in one year might
lead to a budget cut by management for the next year.
• Regulatory failures: Many states reward regulated utilities for selling more
energy and penalize them for reducing retail customer's bills. The fact that
declining block rates exist is evidence of perverse regulatory incentives.
• Informational failures: Not knowing something is possible prevents us
from doing it. Standby power usage for home entertainment systems in the
US consumes about 5,000 MW continuously, yet consumers and
manufacturers don't realize the standby feature is available wi 80-95% less
power through a change in the equipment design.
• Perverse Incentives: The owner of rental property does not have any
incentive to implement even negative cost efficiency improvements when
his/her tenants pay all the utility bills.
• False or absent price signals: The US subsidized the energy supply
industry between $21-36 billion in 1989. Removing subsidies will let the
market determine the equilibrium price and decrease demand for the higher
efficiency items.
Lovins argues that the actual market and the theoretical free market are so disparate
that comparisons are problematic. According to him, the aforementioned barriers are
costing the American economy about $300 billion a year and that compliance with
Kyoto could be achieved with a net gain to the economy.
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Hybrid models that integrate bottom up and top down models do assume the
existence of "no-regrets policies and the existence of market barriers for energy
efficiency. A nice feature of these models is their ability to test the effects of
theoretical policy cases in the "real world". To quantify their theories, the World
Wildlife Fund recently chartered a study that utilized the DOE/EIA National Energy
Modeling System (NEMS) and the Argonne National Lab Long-Run Industrial Energy
Forecasting (LIEF) model to model four primary sectors of the economy; the building
sector, the industrial sector, the electricity supply industry, and the transportation
sector. They find that net savings in energy costs would average $46 billion per year
if Kyoto was met and that wage and cost benefits would increase by about $27 billion
accompanied by a net increase in 900,000 jobs. The electricity supply industry would
meet its target by implementing a 10% renewable portfolio standard (RPS), a
requirement for co-firing of bio-rnass in coal plants, and a cap and trade system for
C02 (to 70% ofBAU levels), NOX and fine particulates (Bernow, et al. pp.9-l0).
The disparities in forecasts for compliance costs between the top down models
of the fossil fuel industries and the models of the environmental research institutes
have been examined in some detail. Goodstein (2001) following Repetto and Austin
(1997) argues that four assumptions drive the differences in cost estimates,
• How flexible and innovative is the American economy?
• Will some emissions reductions be achieved through joint implementation?
• What happens to carbon tax or allowance revenues?
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• What direct or indirect benefits are achieved from climate protection? (p.
145)
The answers to these four questions explain up to 80% of the differences. So which
estimate should the policy maker believe? History might provide a clue. Goodstein
provides data on how compliance costs have differed from predicted cost estimates for
other environmental regimes. In thirteen cases the actual costs never exceed predicted
costs. In fact, overestimation of predicted costs ranged from 41% for CFCs to 2300%
for surface mining. Furthermore, the $350,000 per plant estimate for benzene
mitigation was actually done at no cost resulting in an infinite overestimation of
original cost estimates.
In addition to energy savings, another economic benefit from a sagacious
climate regime could be increased employment in high technology sectors of the
economy. If coal prices rise to reflect anywhere near their true externalities, then the
coal dependent sector of the ESI will experience a net loss of employment. Most
microeconomic models show a net gain in jobs the abatement sector: smokestack
scrubbers, lighting, weatherizing, fuel cells, solar and wind manufacturers will all
experience a net increase in employment. The enhanced productivity and added value
of a solar power technician or home weatherization installer versus a coal miner could
also contribute to macro economic gains.
Congressional delegates from coal mining states often use job losses in this
sector to oppose carbon taxes as there are about 50,000 coal mining jobs in the U.S.
Yet, a recent report by the National Renewable Energy Lab shows that in 1996 the
47
solar photovoltaic industry employed 15,000 people in high paying jobs, while the
biomass power generation industry employs more than 66,000 workers (NREL, 1999).
The clean power sector would reap huge benefits from a carbon regime, but employers
and employees are not as well mobilized politically and are more decentralized
geographically than the fossil fuel sector which hinders efforts to successfully press
for an energy transformation.
To reconcile the expected variances for economy wide costs for the science and no
science scenarios boils down to the decision makers beliefs on the range of expected
outcomes: the costs associated with no protection, and the costs associated with
protection. For the skeptic that believes the warming trends that the Earth is currently
experiencing are only natural occurring variation, and that climate change poses as
many benefits as costs (enhanced agricultural yields) then the worst outcome is
investing in expensive climate protection equipment and technology that is
unnecessary. For the scientific adherent, the socioeconomic costs of the worst
outcome associated with climate change far outweighs the potential costs of
abatement. Unfortunately, calculating the indirect costs of climate change are much
more difficult due to the uncertainty inherent in modeling the complexity of the
Earth's climate and the effects of climate change on socio-economic activity. The
effect of this uncertainty in estimating costs on individual decision-making will be
addressed in the final section.
Estimating the costs and benefits of the best-case scenario according to domain
of the adherent and the skeptic are also more problematic for the protection case than
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for the BAU. For the risk adverse Bush administration operating under the domain of
gains, there is risk in departing from the known universe ofthe status quo. Under this
domain, the US policies of low cost fossil fuels will provide the best possible
outcome. This administration references the top-down econometric models that
forecast the highest costs for climate protection. Thus, for Bush the distribution for
best outcomes would be BAU then protection, and the distribution for worst outcomes
would again be BAU then protection. Table I presents a graphical representation of
the variance of these policy scenarios.
For the risk seeking Clinton administration operating under the domain of
losses, the best possible outcome could have been viewed as increased economic
growth and environmental protection. On the worst case side, the severe costs of
climate change left unchecked under the BAU would offer the worst outcome. Thus,
the distribution for best outcomes would be protection then BAU, and the distribution
for worst outcomes would again be protection then BAU. For the strong science
adherent, since the protection policy has a more favorable best and worst outcome it is
clearly preferable.
5.1.2 Flexible Implementation Mechanisms
As discussed in the preceding section, the cost estimates for the protection
scenario depend on the assumptions and methodologies employed. One key
assumption of the protection scenario is the availability ofGHG emissions trading
between states, as well as letting the industrialized countries receive credit for projects
undertaken on their behalf in developing countries. This section evaluates the
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variance of expected outcomes for two mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol known as
emissions trading and joint implementation. This analyses finds that the variance
associated with the best and worst outcomes from these mechanisms is much greater
than the BAU model, reducing the likelihood that risk averse decision makers would
pursue them.
Emissions Trading
Under Kyoto, states can reduce emissions in any way they choose; traditional
command-and-control (CAC) methods such as taxes on the carbon content of fuels or
setting emissions limits on industrial activities. Another approach to emission
reduction is through an innovative market technique known as emissions trading.
Emissions trading (ET) programs require each state to set a national emissions target
for GHGs, as was done at Kyoto, and then break down total emissions by each
economic sector. Players in each sector are then allocated their "share" of emissions;
low emitters can store their right to pollute or sell it to high emitters either domestic or
international.
Some rich polluters that would use one of these types of policy frameworks,
namely the U.S. and other English speaking states, are suffering from sticker shock
while contemplating reducing greenhouse gas emissions an average of 5%. These
states are looking for ways to cut the bill for compliance with their emissions targets.
The Kyoto Protocol includes an emissions permit trading component, mainly at the
insistence of the Clinton administration, which believed that trading can drastically
reduce the costs of mitigation of pollutants. The U.S. has a long experience with
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emissions trading and is a firm believer in utilizing economic instruments to reduce
the costs associated with environmental regulation.
The U.S. Acid Rain program is generally considered the model for emissions
trading under the Protocol. The political environment became favorable for the
initiation of this program because of the problems with acid rain falling in the
Northeastern U.S. and Canada from coal-fired utility and industrial plants in the
Midwest and on the East Coast. Under a so-called cap and trade model, the U.S. set a
target for its sulfur dioxide emissions. The EPA allocated emissions allowances
amongst power generators and qualifying industrial plants. These participants were
allocated allowances according to a complex formula based on historical emissions.
Firms were then able to emit up to their limit, buy credits to emit past their limit from
other participants, store credits, or sell unused credits. This program allowed
industries to comply with sulfur dioxide emissions requirements for $100 per ton
compared with initial estimates of $400-1 ,000 per ton (Swift, 1998).
Proponents of economic incentives such as ET schemes consistently point to
two components responsible for their economic successes. Most importantly, permit
trading allows operators to profit from what economists call gains- from-trade. In this
case, a firm with a high marginal cost (cost of one additional unit) of abatement can
pay a firm with a lower marginal cost of abatement to reduce emissions which would
count as a reduction for the high cost emitter. A typical example in the Acid Rain
program would be a utility that instead of purchasing expensive abatement equipment
for a quick fix, bought cheap credits from a low emitter and invested the difference in
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the cost between the two alternatives. Over time this provides firms with capital to
invest in new technologies or in fuel switching that will provide more long-term
efficiency (Petsonk, et aI, 1998, p. 5). The total allocation of allowable emissions will
then decrease over time, forcing firms to increase efficiency or to pay stiff penalties on
excess pollutants.
The other economic advantage of market mechanisms is that it allows
operators to utilize their entrepreneurial skills in pursuit of pollution abatement. Rather
than static taxes on inputs or limits on emissions, competition and innovation help
defray costs and invite operators to employ their own ideas to maximize emissions
reductions, the excess allowances can then be sold in the marketplace. Inherent in a
multi-year cap and trade program is a mechanism for temporal and geographic
flexibility, suitable for emissions such as sulfur dioxide and carbon dioxide that have
long environmental lifetimes and spread over large areas. Temporal and geographical
flexibility would allow a utility to "bank" low emissions during a warm winter to
offset the high emission encountered in a later cold winter. Similarly, during a
drought a low emitting hydro-powered utility would have unused credits with which to
offset energy supplied by a high emitting coal utility that is on the same energy grid.
Under one model's prediction these market mechanisms enable the cost of
compliance to fall dramatically under the protection scenario. With no trading,
marginal abatement per ton ranges from $139 to $304 for the US and the EU
respectively. With global emissions trading marginal abatement costs fall to $24/ton
resulting in costs falling 73% to 92% of the original estimates (Pew, 1999).
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Apparently, the best outcome between the BAU and the protection scenario would be
for a well designed program to bring substantial climate benefits for annex I countries
at a modest cost. However, significant monitoring and verification problems exist
with emissions trading schemes, as well as with joint implementation of reduction
projects. For this reason, the discussion of the worst outcomes for ET will be
conjoined with the following evaluation of negative possible outcomes from joint
implementation.
Joint Implementation
The authors of the Framework Convention on Climate Change recognized the
potential problems in including developing countries into the regime. Not only do
many developing countries lack the capital, technology and human skills to implement
reductions on a systematic basis, they also lack the systems of governance necessary
to participate. This lack of regulatory ability and the decentralized nature of
production in some LDCs (such as township and village enterprises in China) makes it
difficult for developing nations to participate in the regime directly. Until these states
are able to 'beef up' their regulatory, legal and monitoring infrastructure they would
not be viable players in a regime that relies on the uniformity and enforcement of
global regulations. In an effort to appeal to the self-interests ofLDCs, a strategy was
introduced for the joint implementation (Jl) of projects to reduce GHG emissions
between developed and developing countries. It allows countries with higher
abatement costs to invest in cheaper emission reduction projects in other countries and
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to receive credits in return for the joint project. As with any regulatory mechanism it
has its strengths and weaknesses.
The most obvious of its strengths are the similarities to the economic benefits
of the ET program as it provides actors with temporal and geographical flexibility in
their economic decision-making. Participants can choose the time and place of their
reduction programs. Proponents argue that the polluters with the lowest marginal cost
of abatement are found in developing countries given their older technology. The
OECD estimates that the costs of energy sector emissions abatement vary by a factor
of about 20 across regions (OECD, 1996, p. II). This aspect, coupled with the
relatively greater purchasing power of developed countries makes this argument
particularly strong. For example, given the strength of the English pound against the
Indian Rupee, a British utility (the investor) could purchase and install a scrubber on
an Indian coal-fired utility (the host) much more cheaply than a scrubber on an
English plant. Similarly, the decrease in C02 would be much greater given the greater
efficiency of the modern English plant versus the older Indian plant. The potential
benefits from the reduction of global GHGs through this mechanism of the treaty
cannot be overestimated.
Another potential advantage of 11is it contains a potentially important
mechanism for obtaining private capital to finance emissions abatement projects
around the world. The difficulty in getting developed governments to give aid for
LDC emissions reductions has been discussed previously. Instead of Western
governments resisting the principle of additionality, private business could form
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transnational links that would result in potentially huge transfers of capital from North
to South. One model estimates that financial transfers from the OECD to developing
countries would rise from $3.6 billion in 1995 to $118 billion by 2020 (OECD, 1996).
Inherent in these transnational links is another advantage of JI, an assumption
of a transfer of technology that the West would bring to LDCs. In fact, the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Protocol, of which JI is a component, is
designed to facilitate technology transfers of environmentally sound technologies that
are publicly owned. Western technology could be used to develop long-term
sustainable development mechanisms in these developing countries.
Finally, the CDM mechanism is designed to create carbon storage sinks as well
as emissions abatement. Carbon storage sinks are created by preserving forests
(primarily tropical forests) that otherwise would be harvested or destroyed. These
sinks then draw in atmospheric C02 and store it as biomass. Carbon sinks are much
less expensive than many direct emissions reduction measures (Harvey and Bush,
1997).
The Disadvantages of Joint Implementation: Measurement and Accountability
Despite the strengths of this mechanism it also suffers some severe drawbacks,
as can be predicted from the carbon storage clause. How is the carbon sink's value to
be calculated and who is going to calculate it? Both the investing and receiving
nations have the incentive to overstate the sink or the reduction amount. Again, third
parties in the form of IGOs or NGO's would need to be involved in the calculation of
credits. The emissions reductions from energy conversion schemes such as switching
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from coal to gas are relatively easy to calculate based on known emissions, but sink
values are much more complex. The mediator must be convinced that the sink to be
"saved" would otherwise have been razed before the negotiations about credits can
begin. The credits allowed are the difference between the baseline and the abatement
target. The baseline is the level of emissions that would have occurred in the absence
of the abatement effort, while the target is another subjective figure about what
happens after the abatement begins. The uncertainty and delays in the process will
raise transaction costs exponentially and could make the program unworkable.
A comparison of the success components for ]Iwith the permit trading system
components yields big question marks for both measurement and accountability,
especially in regards to carbon sink projects. A thorough and ingenious method of
public monitoring and enforcement would need to be devised in order to provide
accountability and transparency for the system. Given the potentially high transaction
costs, the fungibility of the system could also be questioned. If the ]I project were
modified by eliminating the carbon sink provision, it would be much more viable.
While sinks are problematic, the ]Imechanism is a viable method of
technology transfer and has the ability to attract capital to the LDCs, potentially
making it a very effective mechanism of the Protocol. The ]Imechanism within the
Protocol can effectively provide side payments in the form of technology and capital
that lower transaction costs and compliance costs for participants and makes
participation in the regime more attractive to non-Annex I members. Carbon sink rules
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need to be carefully delineated in order for this subcomponent to be viable on a large
scale.
In spite of the favorable potential outcomes associated with ET and JI under
the protection scenario, very unfavorable outcomes are also possible. Emissions
projects undertaken in any country and involving large sums of money can be prone to
government appropriation, corruption, and misrepresentation, but the perception is that
malfeasance is more likely to occur in LDCs. The very nature of project based
reductions makes them difficult to implement on a large scale. In addition to the
problems inherent in projects involving carbon sinks, these mechanisms represent
transfers of wealth between the industrialized and the developing world. Given the
potential problems involved, the protection scenario should rate both the best and
worst possible outcomes. Thus, the distribution for best outcomes would be protection
then BAU, and the distribution for worst outcomes would be BAU then protection, as
presented in Table I. The variance of outcomes for the protection scenario are wider
than for the BAU scenario. For the risk averse Bush administration, prospect theory
predicts that the less risky policy option of the BAU would be chosen. For the Clinton
administration operating under the domain of losses, the more risky protection
scenario would be preferred.
5.1.3 Public Health
The final case study involves the differences in expected outcomes from the
BAU and the protection policies in regards to public health. Under the protection
scenario, improvements in public health are forecasted due to less air born pollutants
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from fossil fuel combustion in the transport and electricity sectors. The highly
respected Working Group on Public Health and Fossil Fuel Combustion released a
report in 1997 that forecasted an additional eight million deaths could occur
worldwide by allowing the business-as-usual (BAU) scenario rather than their climate
policy scenario between 2000 and 2020.7 Over 80% of these "avoidable deaths"
would occur in developing nations and the balance of approximately 1.6 million in
OECD countries. They estimate that in the US alone, in 2020 the "avoidable deaths"
under the BAU model would equal the deaths in 1995 due to liver disease or human
immunodeficiency disease.
Benefits from GHG abatement that reduce the incidence of chronic morbidity
and mortality are posed as central to the public health argument. With improved air
quality citizens suffering from asthma, allergies, respiratory ailments and heart disease
would experience health benefits. Similarly, the protection policy could result in
fewer heat related deaths among primarily poor, urban residents. Unlike other benefits
associated with the protection scenario, the positive externalities associated with
reduced fossil fuel usage accrue in the short term. Therefore, the temporal disconnect
between expenditure and receipt of social benefits is not so large as with other aspects
of climate policy, making immediate action easier to achieve given the short time
frame of most citizens and policy makers. Also, public health benefits from GHG
mitigation will likely accrue more in certain regions and localities than in others.
7 Their climate policy model is a 15% reduction in 1990 levels by 2010 for the developed countries
and a 10% reduction compared to BAU for developing countries, a rather ambitious policy but not
impossible.
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One huge public health benefit from a GHG mitigation regime would be the
reduction of these "conventional" pollutants from coal-fired electricity generation:
sulfur dioxide (S02), nitrogen oxide (NOx), particulate matter and mercury.
Estimates of ancillary benefits to the U.S. for GHG reduction range from $2.88 to
$300 per ton of carbon reduction, with a general agreed guideline of being
approximately 30% of the carbon allowance price (Burtraw and Toman, 1998, p. 6).
The U.S. health care sector consumes about 14% ofGDP, and improvements in
public health from reduced fossil fuel use could represent an opportunity to shift these
expenditures to more productive uses.
How best then to deal with public health from an expected return standpoint?
Consider the argument for the protection case to have the highest expected return. As
fossil fuel usage is curtailed using cost effective means, airborne pollutants are
reduced making the downwind citizens healthier, thus more productive and adding to
economic output. The protection policy does not have the worst outcome, that
estimate is reserved for the BAU. As the US population continues to increase, under
BAU the fossil fuel based transportation infrastructure will be augmented. Similarly
electricity use from coal and gas will increase, and the net result is the population is
becoming negatively impacted by the health externalities associated with fossil fuel
usage.
Thus, according to this scenario, the distribution for best outcomes would be
protection then BAU, and the distribution for worst outcomes would again be
protection then BAU. Given this distribution of expected outcomes, prospect theory
59
would hold that the risk averse Bush administration would favor the protection
scenario with its more favorable relative expected outcomes. Similarly, the risk
seeking Clinton administration would also favor the protection scenario because of the
more favorable relative outcomes. However, in addition to abandoning Kyoto the
Bush administration is currently attempting to roll back air pollution standards for
older coal plants, the New Source Review which would favor the BAD. So it would
appear that there is a disconnect between what prospect theory predicts for the public
health and what is actually being done by the risk averse administration which is
pursuing increased energy supplies. Axelrod (1976) calls this problem the decision-
making problem. Given that we have two policy variables, public health or energy
supplies (which is inexorably linked to economic growth), which one should be
enacted and which subsumed? The Bush administration apparently has decided on
increased energy supplies over improvements in public health. For the public health
case study, according to the way that domain has been operationalized and risk
tolerance defined, apparently prospect theory cannot adequately explain the behavior
of the Bush administration.
5.2 Case Study Synthesis
Table I summarizes the differences in the two administrations' understanding
oftheir domain and how this translates into the dependent variable of policy
preferences. The results indicate that prospect theory, as we have defined domain,
adequately explains President Clinton's behavior on climate policy. Clinton operated
under the domain oflosses and as a strong science adherent believed that the worst
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possible outcome was the damage from climate change associated with continued
fossil fuel usage. His beliefs about the availability of cost effective substitutes for
fossil fuels, including renewable energy and energy efficiency measures, resulted in
his belief that the best possible outcome was associated with the protection scenario.
The emissions trading component on the Kyoto Protocol and the protection scenario
has been shown to be more risky as its distribution of expected outcomes is greater
than that of the BAD scenario. The greater risk of the protection scenario was
appealing to President Clinton who operated under the domain of losses. The public
health benefits also were preferred by Clinton according to how we have delineated
the expected outcomes.
Table 1: Summary oCVariance oCCase Study Outcomes
Economy Economy Emissions
Expected Wide Wide Trading &
Public
Costs: Costs: HealthReturn Weak Strong Joint BenefitsImplementationScience Science
Best BAD PROTECT PROTECT PROTECT
PROTECT BAD BAD BAD
BAD PROTECT BAD PROTECT
Worst PROTECT BAD PROTECT BAD
Note: each policy scenario must have a best and worst outcome.
According to both expected utility theory and prospect theory these public
health benefits should have been pursued by President Bush. That they were not
pursued most likely means that there are other variables that need to be included in the
analysis. Certainly the Bush administration's ties to the fossil fuel industry is one that
could be incorporated into future studies. However, President Bush's beliefs about the
uncertainties of climate science do explain his rejection of Kyoto on economic
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grounds. Since the science is what links the status quo with negative outcomes,
disbelief should result in a continuation of the status quo associated with the BAU
scenario. Table I suggests that the BAU with its higher expected payoffs would be
selected by the weak science adherent. Similarly, this work shows that a risk averse
President Bush would have rejected the Kyoto Protocol and its associated emissions
trading component because of the greater variance of expected outcomes associated
with it.
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6. Conclusion
This paper has explicated the domain of Presidents Bush and Clinton as the
independent variable that can explain climate policy choices made by each
administration. Given that fossil fuels are an essential input to modem economies,
having access to cheap sources of these fuels, ceteris paribus, puts national policy
makers in the domain of gains. This paper argues that the Bush administration still
operates under this domain of gains while the Clinton administration was in a domain
of losses because of its belief in climate change science that predicts major
environmental and socio economic damages if fossil fuel use is not curtailed in the
coming decades.
This paper argues that the disparities in the two administrations regarding
environmental protection and economic growth are due to the strength of each
administrations beliefs in the robustness of climate science. This research indicates
that Bush identifies the state of climate science as uncertain. Associated with this
disbelief is the notion that the status quo is satisfactory, and that the risks associated
with BAD are not as great as the risks associated with Kyoto, putting the Bush
administration squarely in the domain of gains and subsequent risk aversion in policy
preferences. Clinton's comments, on the other hand, show a man with a much greater
belief in the robustness of the science and the negative consequences of the status quo.
Therefore, the Clinton operated under the domain of losses and risk acceptance in
policy choices.
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Using prospect theory, we can see how under the domain of gains the Bush
administration's decision to abandon the Kyoto process, a treaty negotiated by the
Clinton administration, is consistent with its other energy policies. Energy efficiency
and conservation measures have been subsumed to increased energy supplies. In other
words, a continuation of the status quo. In contrast, the mandatory reductions of
GHGs under Kyoto represented a risky and an untested departure from the domain of
gains that the Bush administration operates under.
This paper has examined in detail the complexity of the economic models that
estimate the costs associated with Kyoto compliance. These models assumptions
regarding the flexibility of the US economy, how carbon tax revenues are used, and
the ability of US polluters to receive credit for international emissions reductions
projects are the major drivers for the widely varying cost estimates. Furthermore, the
cognitive map developed for President Bush doesn't indicate any explicit recognition
of jobs created by the adoption ofthe Protocol. Bush's stated belief is that
environmental protection inevitably sacrifices economic growth, and that it must come
as a result of economic growth. This stands in stark contrast with the cognitive map
developed for President Clinton who appears to believe that environmental protection
and economic growth can be synonymous, and that there are jobs to be created by
reducing emissions.
Theoretical And Policy Implications
President Clinton's beliefs in the adverse affects of the status quo and the
ability for economic growth to occur through alternative means are representative of
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change in paradigm from the dominant one to an alternative one. Then this change
needs to be the focus of studies that enable us to understand how and why it occurred.
Prospect theory posits that there are anomalies in decision makers' processes that
affect their behavior. The implications of the endowment effect, loss aversion and
status quo bias are of major importance to climate policy that is made under conditions
of uncertainty.
As we have examined, the default domain is the status quo. But over time the
reference point moves to an adaptation point that reflects the new status quo. Science
is the rose colored lens that drives the shift in domain. However, during that shift
things are still evaluated relative to the old status quo. The weighting function of
prospect theory predicts that people weigh the possibility oflosses more heavily than
they do the prospect of equally large gains. "Loss aversion suggests that the lag will
last longer in adjusting to losses than to gains" (McDermott, 1998, p. 42). In climate
policy terms, this means that individuals are going to resist recognizing that the status
quo is leading to large future damages from climate change. This is fundamentally a
shift from a domain of gains to a domain of losses, or in other words a change in
domain from the dominant paradigm to the alternative paradigm. This change will
lead to an increase in risk tolerance and subsequently more risky policy choices.
In addition to predicting delays in policies reflective of a new paradigm, PT
also holds implications for a carbon tax. Since the dawn of civilization, tax collectors
and the paying oftaxes has always been unpopular. Tax issues were at the heart of
The American Revolution, Shay's Rebellion, and the Reagan revolution and are
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certainly prominent today in the fiscally challenged state and local environments.
From a prospect theory standpoint, taxes are an anathema to individual decision
makers. Since individuals are loss averse and any future tax implies losses, cognitive
biases negatively affect policy platforms that advocate new taxes. (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1988, p. 176). Loss aversion and the issue of how taxes and new
regulations are presented to those who would be impacted by them is another issue
that prospect theory has a great deal to speak about. Prospect theory posits that
individuals will tend to chose an option framed as a gain relative to the status quo, but
with a lower expected return than another option framed as a loss (Quattrone and
Tversky,1988). This loss aversion implies that any future effort to impose a carbon
tax needs to be offset by income tax rebates so that the new policies are neutral
relevant to the reference point of the status quo.
In addition to implications for policy enactment, the status quo bias of prospect
theory also helps to explain the dichotomy in the US between what is called the
precautionary principle and delayed action on irreversible environmental problems. The
precautionary principle argues that polluters should prove a priori that their emissions
will not damage the environment, accompanied by procedures for monitoring and
assessment (Porter and Brown, 1991). However, prospect theory would argue against the
implementation of a systematic precautionary principle for industrial and consumer
activity if such measures are not part of the status quo. Thus their adoption would be
hindered until the status quo is found to lead to losses.
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Akin to the status quo bias is an anomaly known as the endowment effect.
Individuals' tend to value the items that they currently possess more than substitute goods
of similar or greater value. Empirical tests of the endowment effect are robust
(Kahneman, et ai, 1991). This discrepancy between willingness to pay and willingness to
accept means that selling prices are prone to exceed buying prices, sometimes by double
the amount. The implications of the endowment effect for climate policy literally means
that policies to reduce fossil fuel consumption will need to create an incentive structure
that makes clean energy and fuel efficiency cost only half as much as current fossil fuel
based option. Not only do cultural factors favor consumption of large amounts of fossil
fuels, but prospect theory is telling policymakers that it will be difficult to get people out
of their SUVs and other gas guzzlers and into hybrids.
The implications of prospect theory for climate change do not end with the
anomalies of the status quo bias, the endowment effect and loss aversion. Additionally, an
assumption of prospect theory is that decision makers are boundedly rational, in that there
exist limits to their information processing skills. This bounded rationality has serious
implications for climate policy enactment. For example, research indicates that the
Earth's climate in the past has experienced abrupt climate shifts of 10-20 degrees
Fahrenheit in the short span of several decades. In the past, these non-linear changes in
the climate most likely resulted from the cumulative effects of solar radiation or even
shifts in the earth's axis. The NRC concludes that mankind's emissions ofGHGs could
have the same effect on the delicate climate balance. The net effect of these changes was
to change entire ecosystems and raise or lower sea level by 20 or more feet. These
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climatic changes undoubtedly had dire impacts on previous civilizations, and in spite of
current technology and the economic diversification associated with modem society, such
a dramatic climate shift would also devastate our civilization. Climatologists are loathe to
assign exact probabilities to such an occurrence but they do say that there is a "non zero"
chance of such an abrupt climate change occurring within the next century. In fact, the
NRC (200Ib) claims,
"Available evidence suggest that abrupt climate changes are not only possible but
likely in the future, potentially with large impacts on ecosystems and societies (v).
Prospect theory holds predictions for people's evaluation of such extremely low (and
extremely high) probabilities. The simplification process of the editing phase of prospect
theory (which occurs prior to the evaluation stage) implies rounding of probabilities or
outcomes. Because oflimited abilities to understand extreme probabilities, extremely
unlikely probabilities could be disregarded and highly likely probabilities might be
rounded up to near certainty. At other times extremely low probabilities might be treated
as near certainty (as in lotteries), and correspondingly high probabilities might be
underweighted (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, pp. 282-3). Empirical doubt aside,
policies to regulate pollutants whose effects are permanent need to explicitly incorporate
the probability of these non linear events, something that has not been in the discourse
thus far. This lack of policy consideration is possibly due to the rounding bias associated
with cognitive processes.
Strengths and Weaknesses of a Prospect Theory Analysis of Climate Policy
While PT provides ample explanations and predictions for the enactment of
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climate policy, it is limited in its theoretical foundations. PT primarily addresses the
evaluation step of decision-making, it doesn't address screening function. Following
rational choice theory, decision makers under PT are assumed to evaluate policy
alternatives relative to their domain, and it is this domain, as well as how the options
are framed, that determines outcomes. Yet, many alternative policies might not even
be considered due to biases in the decision makers information processing abilities
that rule out possible alternatives before they can be evaluated.
Beach and Mitchell (1998) consider this an adoption decision, that is divided
into screening and choice decisions. Candidate plans are screened according to their
compatibility with the decision maker's principles and goals (p. 14). Prospect
theory's roots in rational choice decision theory rules out the inclusion of values in
decision-making. According the this line of reasoning, if President Bush believes that
environmental regulations hamper economic growth, then any alternative that requires
additional regulation would not be considered. Since Kyoto would require a new set
of such policies, it was not ever a viable policy alternative. Given Bush's quick
abandonment of Kyoto, it is likely that he did not seriously consider it as a policy
alternative.
President Bush's withdrawal from the Kyoto process can be explained by
prospect theory if he did not believe that climate change represents a real threat to the
US. His cognitive map shows disbelief about the state of climate science. Yet, this
disbelief is in direct conflict with the peer-reviewed science of the IPCC and his own
NAS summary. In this case, the IPCC and NAS reports represent "new" information
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about the externalities associated with the business as usual policies of economic
growth. Yet, this new information apparently has not been internalized by President
Bush who clings to existing beliefs about development. Psychologists have dubbed
such phenomena irrational belief persistence and argue that existing beliefs (status
quo) are resistant to counterevidence that would criticize them. Reviewing empirical
studies, Baron (1994) concludes that humans "hold on to our beliefs without sufficient
regard to the evidence against them or the lack of evidence in their favor" (p. 281).
While prospect theory doesn't incorporate all the biases of decision-making, it can
explain why some decisions are preferred over others. Choosing risky policy options
is more likely when decision-makers are placed in the domain oflosses. This paper
has argued that science is the engine that can tear people away from the anchor ofthe
status quo. A belief that economic development can occur with less polluting sources
of energy is also critical for increased risk tolerance to pursue new policies. The
comparisons presented here between Presidents Bush and Clinton provide us with a
critical understanding of some of the important issues involved in the complicated
field of climate policy.
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Appendix: Methodology
To construct the two cognitive maps official documents from 1998 to 2002
were accessed from the weekly compilation of presidential documents at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/nara003.html, as well as the official repository for the
2000 Presidential debates at http://debates.org/pages/debhis2000.html#oct3. The one
debate where Bush spoke about climate change prior to his becoming president was
chosen for two reasons. One, the number of Bush statements on climate change is
limited. Table 1 indicates that these two sources of information surrendered only 13
observations for each decision maker. Second, this source was included because the
Presidential debate was only three months prior to his decision to abandon Kyoto. As
explicated in section 2, Bush's decision employed considerable independence from his
cabinet's recommendations and was done without the benefit of cabinet level briefings
on the issues, indicating he was likely operating under similar beliefs as during the
debate.
The search statement "global warming" OR "climate change" was used to
summon appropriate documents. Search results composed of joint statements between
US Presidents and other foreign leaders were not included in the analysis due to the
possible confounding effects of being drafted by other authors. Similarly, budget
statements and other search results that did not yield substantive information about the
speaker's beliefs regarding climate change were excluded as well. The search results
of the compilation yielded a large sample frame consisting primarily of similar
irrelevant documents. The selection of all the appropriate documents from President
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Bush yielded twelve documents from his presidency, thirteen total counting the
debate.
Interviews and debates accounted for eight ofthirteen statements for President
Bush and the balance were prepared remarks. Although twelve of thirteen remarks by
President Clinton appear to have been prepared, his penchance for impromptu
comments and the rambling nature of many of his "prepared" statements makes it
likely that these statements were adlibbed. The concern here is to be able to draw
credible inferences from the data. If Clinton's prepared statements are not
representative of his beliefs then there will be biases in the cognitive map for him.
Future research efforts that have more resources available could benefit from other
data sources.
The selection process for President Clinton targeted an equal number of
observations to facilitate comparability with President Bush's beliefs. While the
sample frame was again large, only 4-5 of the top scoring search results that yielded
the most information regarding his beliefs were selected. The analysis only included
documents back to 1998 as the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated late in 1997.
Appendix Table 1: Source of Documents for Cognitive Maps
President Year Selected
Bush 2002 3
Bush 2001 9
Bush 2000 1
Clinton 2000 5
Clinton 1999 4
Clinton 1998 4
Total 26
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The cognitive maps were constructed according to the coding rules explicated
by Wrightson (1976). The procedure is to first identify important variables, then to
identify which variable is the cause and which is the effect variable, then determine
whether the relationship between the variables is positive (+), negative (-), no
relationship (0), or indeterminate (?). In sum the cognitive map is a collection of:
Cause Concept => Linkage => Effect Concept for the policy variable under
consideration.
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